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"BIG EIGHT" BEWARE: MULTINATIONAL
ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND THE
INCREASING SCOPE OF SUBJECT




In the recent decision of Department of Economic Develop-
ment v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (U.S.A.), 1 ("DED") the Southern
District of New York found subject matter jurisdiction over a suit
commenced by an agency of the British government against the
accounting firm Arthur Andersen & Company and certain of its
European affiliates. The court thus added a further and quite pos-
sibly dangerous extention to the reach of the United States securi-
ties laws over predominantly foreign parties and transactions, par-
ticularly when accountants and accounting firms have been named
defendants.
The crucial timing of the DED decision cannot be minimized.
For several years, the largest accounting firms in the United
States, commonly known as the "Big Eight," have greatly ex-
panded the depth and breadth of their overseas operations. More
importantly, the Big Eight in America are now closely bonded with
their international branches and affiliates, making them truly mul-
tinational. This has resulted in increased vulnerability to attack in
American courts, even for participation in essentially foreign trans-
actions. The dilemma is exacerbated by the profession's need to
* Copyright 1989. All rights reserved.
** The author is a graduate of St. John's University School of Law (J.D. 1983) and St.
John's University College of Business Administration (B.S. Accounting 1980). He was for-
merly Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable D. Joseph DeVito, United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of New Jersey. He is admitted to the bars of New York and Pennsyl-
vania, and is presently associated with the firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae. He is
also an adjunct Professor of Law, St. John's University College of Business Administration.
The author dedicates this article to Ernest Honecker, Esq., Ernst & Whinney, with
deepest thanks for his encouragement and support in this and other endeavors.
683 F. Supp. 1463 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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maintain high standards of quality control on a uniform, world-
wide basis. This critical need forces the firms to be even more co-
hesive and interdependent, and thus even less likely to escape the
imposition of subject matter jurisdiction under federal securities
laws for engagements primarily foreign in nature.
This Article will first examine the DED opinion and its histor-
ical significance. Secondly, it will analyze the complex evolution of
the subject matter jurisdiction issue, with an emphasis on the ap-
plication thereof to accountants. This analysis will be followed by
commentary on how the increasingly multinational practices of the
major accounting firms create peculiar problems in maintaining
the quality control standards demanded by the accountants' own
comprehensive professional codes. Lastly, this article will explore
the new outer boundaries of subject matter jurisdiction established
by the DED decision and the potentially great burden this puts
upon the multinational accounting firms to balance the demands of





DED is at first blush a straightforward decision denying the
defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that issues of material fact
existed which precluded summary judgment as to the liability of
the defendants under the federal securities laws. However, the fac-
tual discussion and the ruling on the issue of subject matter juris-
diction at the outset of the memorandum opinion indicate that this
case has an impact far greater than its opening pages suggest.
The parties in the proceeding were the Department of Eco-
nomic Development ("DED"), a British governmental agency cre-
ated to promote industrial development in Northern Ireland, Ar-
thur Andersen & Company (U.S.A.) ("AA-US"), Arthur Andersen
& Company (Republic of Ireland) ("AA-Ireland") and Arthur An-
dersen & Company (United Kingdom) ("AA-UK").2 At the outset,
the court classified the defendants as "affiliated accounting firms"3
and parenthetically discussed the conflicting assertions of the par-
ties on this issue.




The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were part of a "uni-
tary worldwide partnership," while the defendants, in turn,
claimed each partnership was a separate entity.4 Finding that an
issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendants were
part of one global partnership, an issue unresolvable on a motion
for summary judgment, the court nevertheless declared that the
instant decision did not depend on whether the defendants were
separate firms or a single partnership.'
The memorandum opinion explained that the predecessor
agency of the DED had contracted with corporate entities con-
trolled by auto builder John DeLorean. The agreement called for
DeLorean to manufacture his ill-fated gull-wing sports car in an
economically depressed section of Northern Ireland.' Manufactur-
ing was to be undertaken by the DeLorean Motor Company
("DMC"), a Michigan corporation, through Delorean Motor Cars
Limited ("DMCL"), a subsidiary in Northern Ireland.7
The financial backing was to be provided by the DED's prede-
cessor agency, which agreed to purchase all of the over 17 million
preferred shares of the Northern Ireland subsidiary. The subsidi-
ary's common stock would have been owned by DMC. Pursuant to
the master agreement between the British agencies and DMC,
DMC and its holding company parent had promised to provide fi-
nancial statements describing DMC and its subsidiaries, including
DMCL.s It was the defendants herein, as DMC's auditors, who cer-
I Id. at 1468 n.1; see G. WEINSTEIN, THE BorroM LINE: INSIDE ACCOUNTING TODAY 213
(1987) ("Arthur Andersen, for example, is a centralized worldwide entity. This has advan-
tages, says AA, because in a 'truly cohesive international organization ... the parts [are
treated] as segments of the whole ... not as individual operations with a loose tie to the
larger organization.' "); see also J. ARPAN & L. RADEBAUGH, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 317 (2d ed. 1985) ("Arthur Andersen & Company is fairly cen-
tralized; its chairman and vice-chairman have worldwide responsibility, and there is profit
sharing among its international partners").
I DED, 648 F. Supp. at 1468 n.1. Of major interest here is the recent decision in CL-
Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 709 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), wherein
Arthur Andersen-U.S. and Arthur Andersen-U.K. were named as defendants in a lawsuit
alleging violations of the federal securities laws. In Goldfield, District Judge Mukasey de-
nied the defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, but under factual circumstances quite dissimiliar to the matters that are the focus of
this writing. Id. at 473-75. However, note that "the parties [had] stipulated that Andersen-
U.S. and Andersen-U.K., for purposes of this case only, may be considered part of a single
international organization." Id. at 479 n.4. One can only guess as to what impact the DED
holding of a year ago had upon the parties in reaching this understanding.
6 Id. at 1468.
7 Id. at 1469.
8 Id. at 1469.
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tified and issued these financial statements from either the New
York or Detroit offices of AA-US. 9
By virtue of this certification, the plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendants committed primary violations of section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 193410 and Rule 10b-5, as well as viola-
tions through aiding and abetting.1" The court stated that the
gravamen of the complaint was "that DMC's Consolidated Finan-
cial Statements were false and misleading, and that by issuing re-
ports certifying these statements, defendants substantially assisted
DeLorean and others in the execution of a fraudulent securities
scheme." 2 The opinion's factual dissertation concluded with a
brief notation of the collapse and ensuing bankruptcy of the
DeLorean enterprises, and the plaintiff's estimate that it suffered
damages of $80 million.' 3 The court noted that the defendants'
motion to dismiss was grounded upon: (1) lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted; and (3) forum non conveniens.14 The court first addressed
the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
Acknowledging the lack of guidance in both the legislative his-
tory and the text of the federal securities laws as to when United
States courts have subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial
transactions, the court turned to Second Circuit precedent for its
formulation of a standard. 5 The Second Circuit, stated Judge
Stewart, has declined jurisdiction over federal securities laws
claims when the domestic conduct alleged to be the "ostensible ba-
sis of jurisdiction" was merely preparatory or amounted to a fail-
ure to act when the bulk of the allegedly fraudulent activity oc-
curred abroad. Conversely, if conduct in the United States directly
9Id.
10 Id. at 1468. Section 10(b) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982).
" DED, 683 F. Supp. at 1468. Rule 10b-5 is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
12 DED, 683 F. Supp. at 1469.
i Id. at 1469-70. The plaintiff's claim of damages did not end with the $80 million
estimate. Utilizing the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statutes
in its complaint, the plaintiff actually demanded some $260 million after trebling and addi-
tional damages, thus adding a further element of notoriety to this litigation. See Harrison,
Look Who's Using RICO, 75 A.B.A. J. 56, 57 (1989).
"I DED, 683 F. Supp. at 1470. The court first stated that "[t]he parties agree that the
purchase of securities in this case occurred abroad." The defendants claimed the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities law because the plaintiff





caused losses to foreign investors, subject matter jurisdiction will
lie in an American forum.16 The court held that it had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over these claims, based first upon activity in this
country by AA-US with respect to the financial statements, and
second, on "the interdependent nature of the DeLorean entities.
' 17
Focusing on the consolidated financial statements and their
preparation, the court admitted that most of the field work for the
audit was, conducted in the United Kingdom and the Republic of
Ireland by AA-UK and AA-Ireland. Nonetheless, the court found
ultimate engagement partner responsibility resided in AA-US's
Detroit and New York offices. The court found that AA-US had a
greater supervisory role "than mere ratification of the overseas au-
dit work.""' For example, AA-US issued specific audit instructions
from this country, some of which were "very detailed." Upon the
completion of the field work abroad, the U.K. and Ireland-based
entities would send material to AA-US's offices in Detroit and New
York in order for the U.S. offices to issue certification reports on
the consolidated financial statements. Of crucial importance was
the court's finding that AA-US "did more than synthesize this in-
formation," as it often conducted additional investigations spurred
by the communications received from across the ocean.' 9
Interestingly, the court further stated that even if the evidence
indicating heavy supervisory involvement was not as strong as it
appeared, "AA-US still may have subjected its conduct to this
court's jurisdiction simply by incorporating AA-UK's and AA-Ire-
land's audits of DMCL into its reports on the Consolidated Finan-
cial Statements. By incorporating these audits, AA-US created a
duty to supervise under generally accepted auditing standards."2
16 DED, 683 F. Supp. at 1470.
17 Id. Reinforcing its decision to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, the court turned
to the close relationship between the DeLorean Motor Company in America and its North-
ern Ireland subsidiary. Id. Essentially, the court found a high degree of identity between the
foreign subsidiary and its domestic parent, based in part on the subsidiary's dependence on
its parent for management and capital. Id. Citing an interoffice memorandum written by
employees of AA-US, the court found that "[t ]he interdependency of the two companies was
recognized by Andersen itself." Id. at 1471.
'8 Id.
19 Id. at 1470-71. The court summarily disposed of AA-US's claim that its supervision
of the foreign auditors was minimal and that all significant audit activity took place not in
the United States but overseas by declaring that the documentary evidence contradicted
that assertion. Id.
20 Id. at 1471. The auditing standards cited by the court relate to professional stan-
dards to be followed by principal auditors in deciding whether or not to make reference to
1989]
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Based on the foregoing statement, it would appear that the district
court found another independent basis for subject matter jurisdic-
tion, grounded in the duty to supervise professional standards im-
posed upon AA-US when AA-US incorporated the AA-UK and
AA-Ireland audit work into its report.
Recognizing that the existence of this duty to supervise would
depend upon additional factual evidence, the court did not decide
the issue. Nonetheless, the court did acknowledge that the plaintiff
had thus raised an issue of material fact: whether AA-US's alleged
breach of its supervisory duty might have directly caused the
plaintiff's losses.2
Judge Stewart concluded that the plaintiff had brought forth
evidence tending to show that domestic conduct in formulating the
consolidated financial statements was a direct cause of its alleged
losses.22 The court held that "[s]tanding alone, this conduct is suf-
ficient to activate subject matter jurisdiction. ' 23 Additional justifi-
cation for this exercise of jurisdiction was found in the "high de-
gree of symbiosis" between the DMC and its foreign subsidiary.24
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss was
denied.2 5
The following pages will begin to reveal the extent to which
DED represents an innovative decision which broke new ground in
an area of great concern to the accounting profession. Certain cru-
cial points need to be borne in mind as the key issues emerge
herein. First, the court emphasized the fact that ultimate responsi-
bility for this engagement resided with the offices of AA-US, not-
withstanding the fact that the bulk of the actual audit work was
conducted overseas. Also critical was the court's finding that AA-
US played a significant supervisory role in this engagement. The
district judge was impressed by the domestic partnership's "de-
an audit examination made by another auditor. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, §§ 543.03, 543.12-.13 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Public Accts. 1972).
21 DED, 683 F. Supp. at 1470-71.
22 Id. at 1471.
23 Id.
24 Id.
2" Id. The district court denied the defendants' motion to certify the instant decision
for interlocutory appeal. Id. at 1487. Since the Second Circuit standard demands live testi-
mony and detailed evidence for determining the materiality of acts giving rise to subject
matter jurisdiction under the securities laws, "the fact-finding job [is] to be performed at
nisi prius .... a task ill-suited for an appeals court on an interlocutory appeal." Id.
[Vol. 63:467
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tailed" instructions regarding the overseas offices' conduct of the
audit. The role of AA-US in performing additional work was also
important to the court's analysis.
Lastly, and possibly of greatest interest, is the court's finding
that AA-US created a duty to supervise its foreign counterparts by
incorporating their audits into its own. Looking to the accounting
profession's own standards of conduct, the court seemed to imply
that the utilization of the foreign audit work created a duty to su-
pervise which may bring about subject matter jurisdiction under
the federal securities laws. The importance of this reliance on the
professional standard of supervision as a potential ground for sub-
ject matter jurisdiction will be demonstrated.
THE SECOND CIRcuiT TRILOGY
In embarking on an analysis of the parameters of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws, one must first re-
flect upon the key decisions: a trilogy of cases decided by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. As stated by the Supreme
Court, the Second Circuit is truly the matriarch of the foremost
jurisprudence in this field and therefore due deference must be ac-
corded to its central rulings.26
Before reviewing the well-known trilogy, we must examine the
cornerstone of the Second Circuit's reasoning, developed over two
decades ago in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.2 7 In Schoenbaum, the
court was faced with fairly straightforward facts. Banff Oil Limited
was a Canadian corporation which conducted all of its business in
Canada and registered its common stock with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), trading on both the American
Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange. Schoenbaum,
an American shareholder, brought a derivative action pursuant to
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.11
On the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the court held that
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had extraterritorial applica-
tion, and that liability arose thereunder with regard to these trans-
actions which took place in Canada between foreign buyers and
26 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (the Second Circuit is "regarded as the 'Mother Court' in this area of the law").
27 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
28 Id. at 204.
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sellers. 9 Writing for the panel, Chief Judge Lumbard stated that
"Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial ap-
plication in order to protect domestic investors who have pur-
chased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the
domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign
transactions in American securities. °3 0 The court acknowledged
that this view was contrary to the presumption against extraterri-
torial application of legislation, but nevertheless found justification
in the need to protect American investors.3'
By dint of this holding, Schoenbaum is considered the leading
decision with regard to finding subject matter jurisdiction under
the federal securities law where activity, albeit foreign, has an ef-
fect upon investors and markets in the United States.32
Having laid the foundation with Schoenbaum, the Second Cir-
cuit established the first of its three famous benchmarks with its
decision in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.3
As in Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit found subject matter juris-
diction existed, but on the ground that significant fraudulent activ-
ity had taken place in the United States. Thus the "conduct" test
was established, whereby a court measures domestic conduct, as
opposed to foreign activity, in deciding whether there was subject
matter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws.
The complaint in Leasco alleged that the defendants violated
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by conspiring to cause Leasco to buy
stock in Pergamon Press Limited, a British corporation controlled
by defendant Robert Maxwell, at prices far beyond its value on the
London Stock Exchange. 4 While much of the fraudulent activity
perpetrated by Maxwell and his cohorts was conducted in England,
the court found that "abundant misrepresentations" were made in
the United States.3 5 Principally, the court looked to initial misrep-
29 Id. at 206.
3I Id.
3' Id. The court stated that the anti-fraud provisions of section 10(b) reach "beyond
the territorial limits of the United States" when a violation thereof "is injurious to United
States investors." Id. As a precursor to later rulings, a footnote mentioned that "a transac-
tion conducted entirely outside of the United States would not violate section 10(b) since
the requisite use of interstate commerce or the mails would be lacking." Id. at 207 n.2.
32 See 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §11.2
(1986).
33 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
34 Id. at 1330.
35 Id. at 1335.
[Vol. 63:467
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resentations by Maxwell seeking to interest Leasco in a joint ven-
ture, further representations by Maxwell's lieutenants at several
meetings, and telephone calls and mail directed to the United
States."
Judge Friendly wrote that if every alleged misrepresentation
had occurred in England, the court "would entertain most serious
doubt[s]" as to the applicability of Schoenbaum simply because of
the adverse effect upon an American corporation, caused by the
fraudulently induced purchase of stock in an English corporation
not traded on American exchanges." The court noted that section
10(b) was meant to protect against fraud in the sale or purchase of
securities regardless of where the stock was traded.3 " The Leasco
court thought Congress' intention was to guard against foreigners
traveling to the United States to fraudulently induce American in-
vestors to purchase foreign securities, and thus held that section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 apply if "substantial misrepresentations were
made in the United States."3 "
The Second Circuit, less than three years after Leasco, devel-
oped the second and third branches of the trilogy simultaneously.
Leading the development was Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,40 a
class action by predominantly foreign plaintiffs, which included
Arthur Andersen & Company as a defendant.4'
The securities transactions giving rise to the litigation in
Bersch concerned common stock of the ill-fated mutual fund or-
ganization, I.O.S. Limited, headed by international financier Ber-
" Id. The opinion relates sordid details of the numerous fraudulent misrepresentations
made by Maxwell and his agents both here and abroad, in furtherance of their scheme to
induce Leasco into purchasing the Pergamon Press Limited stock. Id. at 1330-33.
11 Id. at 1334. The court distinguished this case from Schoenbaum, stating that
Schoenbaum held section 10(b) applicable, even where the fraud was committed outside the
United States involving a foreign company's securities, because the transactions involved a
stock registered and traded on American- markets and thus impacted on American investors.
Id. at 1333. The court stated that:
[T]he language of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is much too inconclusive
to lead us to believe that Congress meant to impose rules governing conduct
throughout the world in every instance where an American company bought or
sold a security. When no fraud has been practiced in this country and the
purchase or sale has not been made here, we would be hard pressed to find justifi-
cation for going beyond Schoenbaum.
Id. at 1334.
31 Id. at 1336.
31 Id. at 1337.
40 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
41 Id. at 977-78.
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nard Cornfeld.42 The I.O.S. stock was sold outside the United
States to foreign nationals residing abroad. Prospectuses were
printed and delivered outside of the United States. I.O.S. stock
was not to be sold to Americans or offered for sale within the bor-
ders of the United States, nor was it listed on the American ex-
changes.43 The I.O.S. prospectuses contained financial statements
accompanied by a report issued by Andersen. The complaint al-
leged that defendant Andersen had failed to observe generally ac-
cepted accounting principles in connection with its audit, with the
result that the financial data in the prospectuses were false and
misleading."
The appeal before the tribunal dealt with the district court's
finding that subject matter jurisdiction existed based upon three
factors: (1) activity in the United States connected to the I.O.S.
stock offering by defendant Drexel; (2) stock sales to Americans,
despite attempts to prevent such occurrences; and (3) generally ad-
verse effects upon the American stock exchanges attributable to
the subsequent collapse of I.O.S.45
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, expressed the belief that
the activities within the United States were sufficient to activate
subject matter jurisdiction." The court, however, expressed doubt
as to "whether Congress would have wished the precious resources
of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be de-
voted to [transactions which are predominantly foreign] rather
than leave the problem to foreign countries. '47
The court observed that while Bersch did not fall within the
ambit of either Schoenbaum or Leasco, the absence of certain ele-
ments present in those cases did not necessarily preclude a finding
of subject matter jurisdiction.48
The Second Circuit then turned to the substance of the juris-
42 Id. at 978.
43 Id. at 980.
14 Id. at 980-81.
15 Id. at 983-84; see also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 456-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975).
4" Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985. The opinion parenthetically enumerated the district court's
findings that numerous meetings were held in New York City between I.O.S., underwriters,
attorneys, and accountants with respect to the offering. Id. Also, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission was conferred with and parts of the prospectus were drafted in the
United States. Id. at 985 n.24.
47 Id. at 985.
48 Id. at 986.
[Vol. 63:467
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dictional question. Postulating a hypothetical, the court noted that
if no Americans had purchased stock and the underwriting related
to a clearly identifiable foreign company, then the activities in the
United States previously described would not justify the taking of
jurisdiction. If there was fraud in Bersch, it was committed by the
release of a false and misleading prospectus which emanated from
a foreign source.49 Unlike Leasco, a substantial part of the misrep-
resentations was not made in the United States.5 0
In short, the Bersch court refused to extend subject matter
jurisdiction "where the United States activities are merely prepar-
atory or take the form of culpable nonfeasance and are relatively
small in comparison to those abroad. [The court] thus conclude[d]
that the action and inaction which occurred in the United States
alone could not confer subject matter jurisdiction. ' 51
The circuit court also rejected the district court's finding of
subject matter jurisdiction based on the adverse effect of the I.O.S.
collapse on American markets.2 Judge Friendly concluded that
subject matter jurisdiction over fraudulent acts relating to securi-
ties which are committed abroad is limited to acts which result in
injury to purchasers or sellers in whom the United States has an
interest.5 3 He emphasized that acts which "simply have an adverse
affect [sic] on the American economy or American investors gener-
ally do not fall in this class of activities. 54
The court did, however, find jurisdiction for the relatively
small group of American purchasers of I.O.S. stock since there was
a direct effect in the United States by the receipt of prospectuses,
which included the Andersen report on the financial statements.55
Significantly, the court held that the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws "[d]o not apply to losses from sales of secur-
ities to foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpa-
"' Id. at 987.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 988. While not doubting the "unfortunate financial effect in the United
States," the court nevertheless held that such "generalized effects" would be insufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction over a damage suit by a foreigner under the anti-fraud
provisions of the American securities laws. Id.
53 Id. at 989.
4 Id.
11 Id. at 991. Furthermore, the court included defrauded Americans residing abroad in
its jurisdiction, finding that even preparatory activities in the United States were adequate
to make the American securities laws applicable to injured Americans residing overseas. Id.
at 992.
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ble failures to act) within the United States directly caused such
losses. 5 6
The final leg of the triad was the Second Circuit's decision in
HT v. Vencap, Ltd.57 This action, for fraud, conversion, and corpo-
rate waste, was another product of the I.O.S. debacle.58 The trans-
action in HT involved an investment in the defendant Vencap by
the plaintiff IT, an I.O.S. mutual fund. With one exception, all of
the meetings leading to the investment by IT took place outside
the United States.59 These meetings led to the creation of a memo-
randum of understanding, which the court found was drafted in
the Bahamas.60 With respect to the agreement which stated that
the investment was to take the form of a purchase of preferred
shares, there was a material disagreement between the parties as to
where it was finalized. The defendants claimed that the memoran-
dum's essential terms and conditions were finalized in the Baha-
mas, while the plaintiffs asserted that the stock purchase agree-
ment was formulated, drafted and negotiated in New York.6 1 The
transaction itself was closed in the Bahamas. 2
On appeal from the district court's order granting a prelimi-
nary injunction against the defendants, the Second Circuit once
again grappled with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 Ini-
tially addressing the fact that one defendant, who owned and con-
trolled other defendants, was a United States citizen, the couit
held that this alone would not bestow subject matter jurisdiction.
The court stated that "[ilt is simply unimaginable that Congress
would have wished the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws
to apply" if an American citizen, while overseas, committed fraud-
ulent acts abroad and defrauded only foreigners.6 4
The court then applied the effects test, and found little factual
support for the view that the defendants' activities "had a signifi-
5 Id. at 993.
519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
88 Id. at 1003.
11 Id. at 1004-05.
60 Id. at 1005.
01 Id. at 1006.
62 Id. at 1007.
61 Id. at 1015-18. Unlike District Judge Stewart, who found jurisdiction on a number of
diverse grounds, the Second Circuit stated that "[w]e think it plain that the only possible
bases for subject matter jurisdiction" would lie within the federal securities laws. Id. at
1015. The district court found subject matter jurisdiction based on the 1933 Act, the 1934
Act and diversity of citizenship. Id.
64 Id. at 1016.
[Vol. 63:467
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cant effect in the United States."65 While some Americans did own
stock in IT, notwithstanding lIT's prohibition on sales to United
States citizens or residents, the court found it dispositive that such
American ownership constituted less than one percent of IIT's
fundholders.66 Even if one were to assume that the instant action
was derivative in nature and was asking to pierce the corporate
veil, the court found that "the result would be almost wholly non-
American," given the de minimis domestic ownership interests.
The court then turned to the third ground for subject matter
jurisdiction: conduct within the United States. The court tacitly
acknowledged that the underpinnings for subject matter jurisdic-
tion, as exposited in Schoenbaum and Leasco, were not present in
HT. The tribunal, however, noted that this did not necessarily pre-
clude a finding of subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case. 8
The Second Circuit then proceeded to set forth the crux of its
holding that there was subject matter jurisdiction in IT. Judge
Friendly opined:
We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to
be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices
for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners. This
country would surely look askance if one of our neighbors stood
by silently and permitted misrepresented securities to be poured
into the United States. By the same token it is hard to believe
Congress meant to prohibit the SEC from policing similar activi-
ties within this country.69
The court reasoned that if subject matter jurisdiction could be ex-
ercised over a suit by the SEC to prevent such exportation of
fraud, then jurisdiction would also be found over a suit, such as the
one here, brought by a defrauded individual.70
The Second Circuit explicitly limited its holding "to the per-
petration of fraudulent acts themselves and [did] not extend [it] to
mere preparatory activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent
acts where the bulk of the activity was performed in foreign coun-
5 Id.
66Id.
11 Id. at 1016-17. Judge Friendly believed that the decision was not within the formula-
tion of Schoenbaum, "even though Schoenbaum does not necessarily set the outmost
reaches for subject matter jurisdiction with respect to foreign activities having effect within
the United States." Id. at 1017.
68 Id.
" Id. at 1017.
70 Id. at 1017-18.
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tries, such as in Bersch.'
Applying this reasoning to the instant facts, the court agreed
with the defendants that there was no significant activity in the
United States with respect to the agreement itself, which was for-
mulated in the Bahamas.72 Vencap's utilization of a New York City
location as a base of operations once IIT had invested its money,
however, could be regarded as fraudulent activity in the United
States giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction.73
In brief, the Second Circuit, in lIT, imposed subject matter
jurisdiction over activity in the United States which entailed the
"export" of fraudulent securities and related schemes. However, in
so doing, the court created self-imposed constraints, limiting its
holding to cases where the allegedly fraudulent acts were more
than merely preparatory. The court thus expanded the boundaries
of subject matter jurisdiction, but carefully delineated the bounda-
ries of this new territory.74
71 Id. at 1018. The court acknowledged the worthiness of the distinction, and its need
for making it by stating that:
[T]he position we are taking here itself extends the application of the securities
laws to transnational transactions beyond prior decisions and the line has to be
drawn somewhere if the securities laws are not to apply in every instance where
something has happened in the United States, however large the gap between the
something and a consummated fraud and however negligible the effect in the
United States or on its citizens.
Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. However, although there was an abundance of American activity, the court could
not determine whether the district judge considered such activity to be within rule 10b-5,
and therefore required further findings on this issue. Id.
7' See id. Most recently, the Second Circuit issued an opinion which may very well
become another landmark decision on this issue. In Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo
American Corp. of South Africa Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom., Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.
1989), the district court was confronted with an injunctive action alleging violations of both
the antitrust laws and the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, all in connec-
tion with a tender offer involving foreign entities. Id. at 490. District Judge Mukasey prelim-
inarily enjoined the tender offer on the basis of the alleged antitrust violations, but dis-
missed the securities laws claims. Id. at 497. The dismissal was predicated on a lack of
domestic activity that was "anything but incidental to the alleged fraud," and, with United
States residents holding no more than 2.5% of the target company's stock, there were no
"effects" within this country. Id. at 496-97. The plaintiff below cross-appealed on the dis-
missal of the securities laws claims. Significant on the appeal was the filing of an amicus
curiae brief by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Brief of Securities and Exchange
Commision, Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC, v. Anglo American Corp. of South Africa Ltd.
(2d Cir. 1988) (Nos. 88-7932-34) [Hereinafter Brief]. The Commission submitted the brief
"to address important questions involving the antifraud provisions of [the federal securities]
laws in an international context." Brief at 2. The agency asserted that the "effects" test
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OTHER SIGNIFICANT CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
While undisputedly the standard bearer of the appellate
courts on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction under federal se-
curities laws, the Second Circuit is not alone in setting meaningful
precedents. Other circuit courts have spoken on the transnational
reach of our securities laws, and these decisions are not always in
accord with the Second Circuit's philosophy.
In SEC v. Kasser,5 the Third Circuit was confronted with the
issue of whether the SEC may invoke federal court jurisdiction
over defendants who allegedly engaged in fraudulent conduct
within the United States, if the sole victim was a foreign corpora-
tion and the alleged fraud had little, if any, domestic impact.76 The
single victim was the Manitoba Development Fund, a corporation
wholly owned by the Province of Manitoba, Canada, and created to
interest private enterprise in forestry development within that re-
gion. It was alleged that the defendants induced the entity to
purchase debenture securities in two corporations, which were os-
tensibly engaged in the forestry industry."
postulated by the Second Circuit was satisfied here, due to the fact that the American vic-
tims were substantially affected by the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations made in con-
nection with the tender offer. Brief at 11. "[T]he presence and greater number of foreign
victims cannot deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction." The Commission concluded
by requesting the court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction here because enjoining the
tender offer worldwide would overwhelm the effect in the United States and would be un-
warranted under these circumstances. Brief at 22. In deciding the appeal, the Second Circuit
concluded that "the tender offer had sufficient effects within the United States to warrant
application of American securities laws and that the District Court should have asserted
subject matter jurisdiction." Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252,
255 (2d Cir. 1989). Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Newman ruled that District Judge
Mukasey's analysis could not be reconciled with the Second Circuit's prior holding in
Bersch and that the district court should have asserted jurisdiction for reason of foreign
nominees forwarding the tender offer documents to American shareholders. Id. at 262. This
"effect," held the court, "was clearly a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside
the territory of the United States." Id. To be sure, Judge Newman looked to the fact that
the "American residents representing 2.5% of [the target company's] shareholders owned
5.3 million shares with a market value of about $120 million." Id. Turning to the request of
the SEC for the appellate court to find subject matter jurisdiction but to nevertheless direct
the lower court to abstain, the tribunal declined that suggestion and instead remanded the
securities laws claims for further proceedings. Id. at 263. The instant decision would, at first
blush, appear to be an unremarkable application of the established holdings of the Second
Circuit. Yet given the remand and the assertion of jurisdiction, it is well within the realm of
possibility that this opinion or its progeny will set a key precedent as to the extent of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws.
75 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
71 Id. at 110.
7 Id. at 110-11.
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Writing for the panel, Judge Adams found that the alleged
fraud was "[tlransnational in character," but that a number of
fraudulent acts also took place in the United States. 78 The district
court found that this conduct included negotiations, the execution
of an investment contract, the use of the telephone and mail sys-
tems, and the establishment of corporate offices, all in the United
States.7 9 However, in light of the fact that the securities in ques-
tion were neither traded on any American exchange nor sold to
United States citizens, 80 the court questioned whether the alleged
fraud had any effect on domestic markets, especially since the
plaintiffs did not so claim. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit found
that jurisdiction did indeed exist.81 Judge Adams referred to the
court's prior holding that "'[c]onduct within the United States is
alone sufficient'" to apply subject matter jurisdiction under the
federal securities laws when transnational securities fraud was per-
petrated with respect to an American over-the-counter stock."
Judge Adams stated that "the conduct of the defendants here
cannot be deemed to be 'mere[ly] preparatory' to fraudulent acts
committed outside this country."83 Finding the defendants' activ-
ity in the United States more substantial than the activity in HT
or Bersch, the court questioned "whether it can be convincingly
maintained that such acts within the United States did not di-
rectly cause any extraterritorial losses. 8 4 The panel recognized its
decision to be in large measure a policy decision, designed not to
embolden those who would use the United States as a base for de-
frauding foreign investors.85
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had less difficulty
18 Id. at 111.
11 Id. The court stated that "[i]n short, there was significant conduct which formed
part of the defendants' scheme that did not occur within this country." Id. at 110-11.
80 Id. at 112.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 112-13 (quoting Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir 1976)).
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Kasser court was not faced with a "predominantly foreign"
transaction. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 113. In Straub, "[t]he fraudulent scheme was conceived in
the United States by American citizens, involved stock in an American corporation traded
on American over-the-counter exchange, and an American securities broker from his office
in New Jersey was responsible" for the fraudulent acts. Straub, 540 F.2d at 595; see Kasser,
548 F.2d at 113.
83 Id. at 115.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 116.
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in finding subject matter jurisdiction in United States v. Cook. 6
Cook, the appellant, claimed that the trial court, which had con-
victed him of securities fraud, lacked jurisdiction because "the al-
leged fraud was committed solely upon foreign investors and ...
had no impact upon either the domestic markets or domestic in-
vestors.1 17 Cook and his confederates operated a "Ponzi" scheme
out of Dallas, Texas, selling interests in oil and gas wells located in
the United .States to Europeans."8 Writing for the court, Judge
Thornberry concluded that "[t]he present scheme is so far within
the jurisdiction of the American courts as to give us little pause."8 9
The panel found Cook's operations out of Dallas were "hardly pre-
paratory": the foreign investors purchased American securities,
funds were repatriated into the United States and some investors
were actually defrauded, in part, in the United States.90 The court
noted that this conduct was an adequate basis for jurisdiction, and
did not address the possibility of subject matter jurisdiction based
upon effects in the United States.9
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit established its
own precedent for subject matter jurisdiction in Continental Grain
(Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.92 In Continental
Grain, the plaintiff had purchased all the stock in an Australian
seedstock corporation from the defendant, a California corpora-
tion, and two other vendors, one an Australian and the other a Cal-
ifornian. The plaintiff, an Australian corporation, was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of a Delaware corporation. The contract for the
sale of stock was executed by the defendants in California, with
the closing intentionally held in Australia for tax reasons. The ini-
tial payment was made in Australian dollars, thereafter converted
Be 573 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978).
87 Id. at 282.
I' Id. at 282-83. The purchase agreements were executed in Europe but recorded in the
United States. Potential investors also visited the oil wells in Texas. Id. at 283.
"1 Id. The Fifth Circuit determined that it could "leave for another day an attempt to
formulate the outer perimeter of American jurisdiction." Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at n.4. The court opined that it would be absurd to believe that Congress did not
intend subject matter jurisdiction where the alleged fraud involved domestic securities sim-
ply because the victims were not Americans. Id. at 283. Like its brethren, the Fifth Circuit
found jurisdiction to prevent the United States from being a haven for swindlers and confi-
dence men victimizing foreigners. Id. at 284.
02 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
11 Id. at 411.
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to United States currency and wired to California. 4
The principal asset of the corporation which the plaintiff pur-
chased was a seedstock license agreement. The defendants failed to
disclose that the licensor of that agreement had made known its
refusal to renew the license some weeks before the closing.95 The
gravamen of the complaint was the plaintiff's allegation that this
failure to disclose the expiring license constituted a violation of
section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-52.9
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the securities transac-
tion at issue was international in scope, the victim was a foreign
corporation, the securities were not traded on any American mar-
ket and there was no significant effect on domestic markets or in
the United States. Nevertheless, the court was persuaded that
the fraudulent nondisclosure, devised in the United States, was "at
least some activity" in this country in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme.98 The court found the use of the mail and other instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce determinative, ruling that such
use was "significant enough to establish subject matter
jurisdiction."'99
The court made it clear that jurisdiction may be established
by meeting the requirements of either the conduct test or the ef-
fects test.100 In the instant case, the effects test was not satisfied,
since any effect within the United States was insubstantial and too
remote. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that harm to
it, even as an Australian entity, would be reflected adversely in its
American parent's financial condition. 10' Since the effects test did
not give the court jurisdiction, the court examined the conduct
test. 02
94 Id. at 413.
15 Id. at 411-13.
" Id. at 413.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 415.
99 Id.
'oo Id. at 417.
101 Id. The court also found that the domestic status of the defendants had no "inde-
pendent significance for jurisdictional purposes." Id.
'' Id. Interestingly, the court stated its belief that the Third Circuit in Kasser "ex-
tended the boundaries of the necessary domestic conduct required to find subject matter
jurisdiction" as defined previously in the Second Circuit cases. Id. at 418. Indeed, the panel
found the Third Circuit analysis was consistent with the Eighth Circuit's own previous deci-
sion finding subject matter jurisdiction attaching whenever significant conduct occurs in the
United States. Id. at 419 (citing Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (1973)).
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In applying the conduct test, the court first addressed the de-
fendants' argument that jurisdiction was not proper because the
securities transaction was "predominantly foreign: a foreign corpo-
rate plaintiff, foreign securities neither registered nor traded on a
national securities exchange, no impact or effect in the United
States, and negotiations and conduct largely outside the United
States.' 10 3 Notwithstanding these extraterritorial factors, the court
found subject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws
did exist in this case. Judge McMillian wrote that the failure to
meet the effects test was not fatal to a consideration of subject
matter jurisdiction and instead, "we examine the relationship be-
tween defendants' conduct in the United States and the alleged
fraudulent scheme, specifically whether defendants' conduct in the
United States was significant with respect to the alleged violation,
and whether it furthered the fraudulent scheme. '104
The defendants' conduct, according to the court, included the
use of the mails and the telephone necessary to further the fraudu-
lent scheme and to organize and complete the fraud. Facilities of
interstate commerce were also used to transmit the proceeds of the
stock sale and transport corporate representatives of the defend-
ants from America to Australia and back. 05 The court concluded
that the conduct here was significant and not merely preparatory,
in that the fraud "was devised and completed in the United
States."'
In sum, the Eighth Circuit, in a policy-based ruling, held that
subject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws is
found "where defendants' conduct in the United States was in fur-
therance of a fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to
its accomplishment, and moreover necessarily involved the use of
the mails and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce.' 1 07
In Travis, Judge Heaney ruled that "subject matter jurisdiction attaches whenever there has
been significant conduct with respect to the alleged violations in the United States ...
[T]he essential issue is whether the defendants' conduct in the United States was of such
significance to subject them to the jurisdiction" of American courts. Travis, 473 F.2d at 524.
103 Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 420.
104 Id. (citations omitted).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 421. The court stated:
Like the Second Circuit, we are reluctant to conclude that Congress would have
intended the securities laws to have a global reach when the domestic conduct is
insubstantial or the domestic impact is too generalized or insignificant. The range
of significant conduct should, however, be fairly inclusive. This is consistent with
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The Ninth Circuit examined the issue of subject matter juris-
diction under the federal securities laws in Grunenthal GmbH v.
Hotz.10 In Grunenthal, each party to the action was either a for-
eign citizen or foreign corporation, and the negotiations for the se-
curities purchase in question occurred outside the United States,
save for a single meeting. 109 Acknowledging that the court had spo-
ken infrequently on the subject, Judge Reinhardt noted that the
Ninth Circuit previously exercised subject matter jurisdiction over
transnational securities cases where the transactions produced ef-
fects within the United States. He emphasized, however, that the
court had never held "that the absence of such effects precludes
the exercise of jurisdiction or that conduct alone is not enough. 110
After reviewing the tests advanced in Continental Grain and
Kasser, the tribunal found that those benchmarks advanced the
underlying policies of the federal securities laws, primarily because
they discouraged those who wished to defraud foreign purchasers
of securities from using the United States as a base of opera-
tions."' Moreover, Judge Reinhardt concluded that the views es-
poused in Continental Grain and Kasser were consistent in fulfil-
ling the congressional intent to maintain high ethical standards for
those conducting securities transactions, thus encouraging Ameri-
can lawyers, accountants and underwriters to "behave
responsibly." 112
Adopting the rationale of Continental Grain, the court found
that the misrepresentations that took place in the United States
were significant and furthered the fraudulent scheme. Moreover,
the court determined that the conduct in this country was not
"merely preparatory," since it was material to inducing the plain-
tiff to enter into the transactions." 3 Judge Reinhardt noted that
the execution of the agreement regarding the stock purchase,
which was executed in Los Angeles, "constituted an act that
strongly supports our assertion of jurisdiction." 1 4
the general purpose of the securities laws to mandate the highest standards of
conduct in securities transactions.
Id.
lo8 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983).
109 Id. at 422-23.
110 Id. at 424.
" Id. at 424-25.





Mindful that the parties were all foreign entities who allegedly
conducted this transaction in the United States merely as a conve-
nience, the court emphasized that a contrary result in the case
would make it convenient for foreigners to use the United States
and American "lawyers, accountants and underwriters to further
fraudulent securities schemes." '115
Reviewing the jurisprudence of the appellate courts other than
the Second Circuit, it is clear that they have interposed less strin-
gent requirements to a finding of subject matter jurisdiction under
the federal securities laws. In Kasser, the Third Circuit opined
that the "conduct" test would be met if there was "at least some
activity" furthering a fraudulent scheme occurring in this country.
The Continental Grain decision tracked Kasser for the most part,
but clearly the Eighth Circuit fully intended to extend the jurisdic-
tional boundary. The Continental Grain court was apparently
faced with even less activity in the United States than was the
Third Circuit in Kasser, yet it likewise found subject matter juris-
diction. It is worth noting that the Eighth Circuit holds that the
term "conduct" should be "fairly inclusive." Both cases entailed
domestic conduct easily interpretable as sufficient to activate sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws, even if
ruled upon by the more circumspect Second Circuit. But the
Kasser and Continental Grain courts swept beyond the frontiers
previously delimited by their brethren, and made it clear that they
would broaden the "conduct" test by finding subject matter juris-
diction where some, though not necessarily significant, activity
took place in the United States. Indeed, the holding in Continen-
tal Grain that the court would take a more inclusive view of con-
duct established a new benchmark. Finally, both opinions spoke
significantly of policy aspects. Undeniably, the lack of legislative
guidance in this area has intensified the courts' difficulties in deci-
sion-making. However, whether this justifies rulings based on pol-
icy is a complex question.
In sum, many circuit courts of appeal have availed themselves
of the Second Circuit's leading decisions, whereas other courts
have struck out on their own, and in so doing, have widened the
scope of subject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities
laws.
1,5 Id. The court also implied that jurisdiction could be found in this case because ac-
tivity in the United States directly caused the plaintiff's losses. Id. at 426.
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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND ACCOUNTANTS
Having examined the basic precepts of subject matter jurisdic-
tion in the application of the federal securities laws in the forego-
ing sections, we may now turn to the ramifications of the exercise
of that jurisdiction over accounting firms involved in transnational
securities transactions.
F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co.," 6
written shortly after the Bersch decision, relied heavily on the rea-
soning of the Second Circuit therein. F.O.F., a Canadian mutual
fund and a subsidiary of the I.O.S. organization, purchased deben-
tures of a Delaware corporation which made the offering for the
purported purpose of funding its overseas operations."1 This offer-
ing was strictly conditioned on prohibiting sales of the debentures
in the United States or to American citizens." 8 Ironically, the same
stricture applied to Canadian citizens and corporations as well.
The court found that F.O.F. purchased its debentures from a Lux-
embourg bank, which was also an I.O.S. subsidiary. Consequently,
F.O.F.'s purchase was made in violation of the underwriting
restrictions." 9
In its complaint, F.O.F. alleged that the debenture offering
materials contained materially misleading statements, and also al-
leged that defendant Arthur Young & Company, a "Big Eight" ac-
counting firm, caused a misleading "comfort letter" to be delivered
to the underwriters in connection with the offering, which closed in
London. 1 0 When F.O.F. moved to amend its complaint, the court
directed the parties to brief the issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.121 In its subsequent decision, the court addressed F.O.F.'s
contention that its claims arose out of a transaction that was
"predominantly American," primarily because the defendant
American entities, operating from the United States, devised and
implemented a fraudulent securities scheme. This allegedly in-
cluded the drafting and reviewing of the aforementioned "comfort
.16 400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
"1 Id. at 1220-21.
118 Id. at 1221. The condition was necessary in order for F.O.F. to comply with the
federal securities law, since the debentures were not registered under the Securities Act of
1933. See id. at 1220.
119 Id. at 1221.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1222.
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letter" in New York. 122
In his opinion, Judge Bonsai concluded that F.O.F., a Cana-
dian corporation, was not within the intended or lawful group of
offerees of the debentures, since its purchase violated the under-
writing conditions. Furthermore, its purchase was indeed predomi-
nantly foreign, as F.O.F., an alien itself, purchased the debentures
overseas from a foreign source and thereby "incurred its losses
outside the United States.' 123 Applying Bersch, the court decreed
that a foreign entity such as F.O.F. might invoke the protection of
the federal securities laws "only if it suffered loss from [securities]
transactions involving . . . 'acts . . .within the United States
[which] directly caused such losses.' "1124 The court ruled that the
conduct which allegedly caused the losses of F.O.F. occurred en-
tirely abroad. The fact that there were American defendants was
"of little independent significance.' 1 25 The court thus found that
the standards for subject matter jurisdiction under the federal se-
curities laws had not been met and dismissed the complaint. 126
In IT v. Cornfeld,127 a proceeding which included Arthur An-
dersen & Company as a named defendant, "vexing questions with
respect to the reach of the anti-fraud provisions of our securities
laws with respect to transactions having substantial foreign ele-
ments" were raised.' 28 The litigation arose from the plaintiff's
three series of acquisitions of companies controlled by John King,
an American entrepreneur, whose companies owned numerous for-
eign subsidiaries. 129 IT purchased significant interests in King's
domestic and foreign companies; the transactions took place in
both the European Eurodollar market and in the United States
over-the-counter market.130 In its complaint against Arthur Ander-
sen & Company, IT alleged that Andersen aided and abetted the
fraud, "partly because of its accounting work on the false and mis-
122 Id. Specifically, F.O.F. alleged that the offering circulars failed to reveal "the major
intended uses of the proceeds of the offering," and that the defendants participated in the
closing "without revealing . . . the true circumstances surrounding the transaction." Id. at
1221.
12 Id. at 1222-23.
124 Id. at 1223. (quoting Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
121 Id. at 912.
129 Id. at 914.
130 Id.
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leading prospectus."'1 -1 Arthur Andersen acted as the independent
certified public accountants for King's principal company, King
Resources Company. Working out of its Denver office, Andersen
audited and certified the financial statements utilized in both the
domestic and foreign debenture offering prospectuses." 2
The circuit court approved of the district court's rejection of
subject matter jurisdiction under rule 10b-5, a rejection based on
the finding that the transactions in question lacked the "necessary
effect" within the United States .1 33 The lower court rejected juris-
diction based on conduct within the United States as well, reason-
ing that the alleged deception was perpetrated by foreigners on
foreign investors residing outside of the United States.3 4 It was on
this point that the court of appeals diverged from the district
court.
The court first addressed the plaintiff's securities purchases of
King's American entities. "Apart from the fact that these were se-
curities of American corporations, the transactions were fully con-
summated within the United States. 13 5 However, Judge Friendly
expressly stated:
[W]e do not mean to suggest that either the American nationality
of the issuer or consummation of the transaction in the United
States is either a necessary or sufficient factor, but rather that the
presence of both these factors points strongly toward applying the
anti-fraud provisions of our securities laws. 136
The Second Circuit was swayed by the facts that the American
securities at issue were purchased in the domestic over-the-counter
market and were then held by a New York custodian. The panel
saw "nothing foreign" in the transactions, except for the foreign
status of the purchaser and the transmission of its purchase orders
from abroad. 37
The court's analysis focused next on the securities of King's
foreign company. The court, distinguishing the case from Bersch,
131 Id. at 915.
132 Id.
"I Id. at 916-17. The circuit court upheld the lower court's finding that the transac-
tions involved were not sufficient to warrant the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in
light of the Bersch and Vencap effects tests. Id. at 917.
134 Id.
"I Id. at 918.




which dealt totally with foreign securities, found the foreign offer-
ings "closely coordinated" with the domestic offerings, especially in
light of the fact that the foreign debentures were convertible into
common stock of King's American company."' 8
Thus, the court reaffirmed its holding in IT that the United
States should not be used as a base for exporting fraud, especially
when the securities in question are American.139 The fact that the
offering was conditioned on the stock not being sold within the
United States or to Americans does not indicate that, if fraud had
been committed in the United States, our courts would look
away.1 4
0
The Second Circuit closed by stating that such a determina-
tion "depends not only on how much was done in the United
States but also on how much (here how little) was done abroad. 1 41
In the first of two significant decisions by Judge Stewart, au-
thor of the DED opinion, Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen
& Co. ("F.O.F. L"),142 the plaintiff sought "to recover damages re-
sulting from a fraudulent scheme orchestrated by John M. King
and his cohorts involving a series of natural resource transac-
tions. ' 143 Andersen defended, inter alia, on the ground of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under federal securities laws.144 Ander-
sen and its affiliated firms, Arthur Andersen & Company (Switzer-
land) and Arthur Andersen & Company S.A., allegedly paticipated
in the fraud. 145
Judge Stewart stated in his opinion that the court "must de-
138 Id. at 919. The court refused to allow "the interposition of a foreign subsidiary of
this kind" to deter it away from the real facts, and stated that:
The fact that we are dealing here with debentures which in substance were Ameri-
can rather than foreign securities has bearing of several sorts. The first goes back
to the effects test. We think Congress would have been considerably more inter-
ested in assuring against the fraudulent issuance of securities constituting obliga-
tions of American rather than purely foreign business.
Id. at 920.
139 Id.
140 Id. The court also noted that there was greater relative American participation than
in other cases. Id. Of particular importance was the panel's finding that "all the accounting
work was and had to be done in the United States." Id. Combined with the utilization of an
American underwriter, and the entire drafting and printing of the prospectuses in America,
it is little wonder the tribunal noted "the lack here of. . .foreign activity." Id. at 920-21.
241 Id.
142 [Decisions 1982] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 98,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
143 Id. at 93,877.
244 Id. at 93,878.
145 Id. at 93,881.
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termine whether the transactions were predominantly foreign,"
and, if so, whether Congress's intent could have been to allocate
the resources of American laws and courts to such disputes, or in-
stead to leave the problem to foreign countries.146 Recognizing that
no single factor is dispositive in this matter, the court stated that
it would look to the "location and citizenship of the purchasers
and sellers, the locus of the fraudulent activity and the extent of
American participation," if any. 47 The trial court assumed the
purchasers were foreign, and sought to determine if there was suffi-
cient conduct in the United States to confer subject matter juris-
diction. On this point it found that "Andersen performed a sub-
stantial portion of the accounting work concerning the relevant
transactions in the United States where the documents of title to
the natural resource assets were located," and also that payments
by the plaintiffs for the purchases were remitted in the United
States as well.' 48 The district judge weighed "these significant
American contacts" against foreign activity and found the foreign
nature of the purchase was not controlling. 149 For these reasons,
Andersen's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were de-
nied, and Judge Stewart decreed that "subject matter jurisdiction
over the complaint [had] been established.' 150
In the second decision rendered in Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Ar-
thur Andersen & Co. ("F.O.F. I"), 1' 1 approximately 18 months
later, the same district court was confronted with the claims of the
plaintiffs pertaining to its investments in natural resource assets
which they had purchased from the King family of companies. 52
After a jury trial that resulted in a verdict assessing liability under
the federal securities laws, the Andersen defendants moved for a
new trial and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.153 Since the
court had previously addressed the question of subject matter ju-
risdiction in F.O.F. I, the court made short shrift of it in F.O.F.11.154
146 Id.
147 Id.
146 Id. at 93,881-82.
149 Id. at 93,882.
160 Id. at 93,884.
151 545 F. Supp 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
152 Id. at 1326-29.
'53 Id. at 1325-26.
151 Id. at 1345-51. Judge Stewart noted his previous consideration of the defendants'
claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and declined to rehash the rationale of the prior
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The court concluded that the purchases of natural resource as-
sets herein "had few foreign elements." '155 To support this opinion,
the court looked to the American citizenship of both King and
some of his companies, negotiations conducted in the United
States concerning the transaction, domestic transfers of funds,
and, interestingly, certain revaluation services "worked out" by
[Andersen] in Denver, Chicago and New York.156 The thrust of the
court's rationale for exercising subject matter jurisdiction seemed
to focus on Andersen's activity within the United States. 5 7
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit decided a case which represents an important juncture in
the evolution of subject matter jurisdiction under the federal se-
curities laws. In Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,' 58 the plaintiff
sued on behalf of himself and some thirty other citizens of the
Federal Republic of Germany alleging, inter alia, violations of the
federal securities laws by Andersen. " 9 While it was the sole de-
fendant, Andersen's presence in the litigation stemmed from its re-
lationship with Arthur Andersen & Company, GmbH ("Andersen -
GmbH"), its West German affiliate.160
The transactions which caused the instant suit were the plain-
tiffs' investments in a West German limited partnership, which, in
turn, funded an American limited partnership that invested in real
estate in Tennessee and Georgia. The complaint alleged that these
decision, but stated that "the present procedural context requires that we elaborate some-
what on our earlier opinion." Id. at 1350.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1351. The court stated:
An issue in this case even more critical than the conduct of the King entities
was the conduct of AA [Arthur Andersen] in providing accounting services to par-
ties intimately involved in all phases of the case on both sides of every relevant
transaction. AA audited KRC, TCC, and John King personally, and performed
substantial services for FOF, IOS, and NRC in Denver, Chicago, and New York...
. The Denver office performed substantial work on the natural resource interests,
in coordination with the Swiss office of AA, which reviewed matters at IOS head-
quarters and FOF's executive office in Ferney-Voltaire, France.... While AA's
activities could not provide subject matter jurisdiction where none previously ex-
isted, they are among the weighty United States contacts which support the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in this case.
Id. This led to the court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial, and to award a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict only on limited parts of the allegations of violations of the
federal securities laws. Id. at 1382.
115 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
so Id. at 28.
119 The plaintiffs also had an action pending against Andersen in West Germany. Id.
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investors relied on numerous misrepresentations and material
omissions made by Andersen GmbH, in an audit report which ana-
lyzed the West German limited partnership and its American in-
vestments. It was undisputed that this report was prepared in
West Germany and distributed only to West German investors in
West Germany. 161 Andersen was not directly involved in the solici-
tation of investors or in the preparation of any materials used in
the transactions. The action against Andersen was predicated on
only one link-the German audit report which had a single refer-
ence to Andersen. The report stated in German that with respect
to certain data in the prospectus regarding economic fundamen-
tals, "we [Andersen GmbH] have made inquiries thereabout by
way of our branch-establishment Arthur Andersen & Co.,
Memphis."' 62
Judge Bork, writing for the court, commenced by noting that
this was a question of first impression for the D.C. Circuit. 6 3 Rec-
ognizing the lack of legislative or congressional guidance, the court
observed that they had to meet the unavoidable task of discussing
a purely hypothetical legislative intent.'
The court surveyed the case law of its sister circuits, noting
first that the plaintiff relied on Andersen's "domestic conduct" as
the alleged jurisdictional basis.' "The Second Circuit has set the
most restrictive standard," the court found, by declining jurisdic-
tion where the conduct within the United States was "merely pre-
paratory" and not the direct cause of losses elsewhere. 66
The court rejected the test of the Eighth Circuit, finding that
it diverged significantly from the Second Circuit standard, by "ex-
plicitly repudiat[ing]" the requirement that domestic conduct con-
stitute the elements of a rule 10b-5 violation. 6 7 Similarly, the
Zoelsch court deemed the Third Circuit formulation, which allows
161 Id.
162 Id. at 29.
163 Id.
14 Id. at 30.
165 Id.
166 Id. Distilling the Second Circuit's decisions, the Zoelsch court posited its brethren's
rule as finding subject matter jurisdiction where the domestic conduct comprises all of the
necessary elements of a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. These elements would
include fraudulent statements or misrepresentations originated in the United States, the
presence of scienter, in connection with the sale or purchase of securities, and actual harm,




for subject matter jurisdiction where at least some activity further-
ing the fraud occurs within American borders, "more permis-
sive."168 In rejecting these standards, the tribunal stated that
"[t]he consequence of these approaches has been a loosening of the
jurisdictional requirements: any significant activity undertaken in
this country-or perhaps any activity at all-that furthers a fraud-
ulent scheme can provide the basis of American jurisdiction over
the domestic actor.' '1
69
The Zoelsch court then opted for "a more restrictive test,"
such as the Second Circuit's. 70 Deciding not to assert jurisdiction,
the panel grounded its decision on essentially three points.' 7'
First, finding it "quite clear that the purpose of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was the protection of American investors
and markets," the court inferred that the federal securities laws do
not apply to transactions outside of the United States that do not
harm such domestic investors or markets. 172 Second, American ju-
dicial resources should be conserved for the resolution of domestic
disputes and the enforcement of domestic law.173 Third, the court
refused to extend subject matter jurisdiction based on policy con-
siderations, as had the Third and Eighth Circuits, and expressed
its disagreement with courts that did so; the court stated its pref-
erence for Congress to act if there is a need to address the
problem. 174





172 Id. The court stated an "established canon of construction" that Congressional legis-
lation, unless stated otherwise, is intended to apply within the territorial boundaries of the
United States. Id.
173 Id. at 32. The court stated that "[i]t is far from clear that these resources would be
well spent on all the potential disputes in which domestic conduct makes a relatively small
contribution to securities fraud elsewhere." Id.
174 Id. The court expressed its stance of judicial deference in holding that:
Congress did not think about conduct here that contributes to losses abroad in
enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; it could easily provide such jurisdic-
tion if that seemed desirable today..., We are not persuaded by the reasoning of
those circuits that have broadened federal court jurisdiction for reasons that are
essentially legislative. In Continental Grain, the court said, "[w]e frankly admit
that the finding of subject matter jurisdiction in the present case is largely a pol-
icy decision." 592 F.2d at 421. Yet Congress is available to make any policy deci-
sions that are required.
Id. (citations omitted).
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United States to become a "Barbary Coast" for securities "pi-
rates," but disavowed any interest to indulge in what it no doubt
considered judicial legislation. 15 The court held that jurisdiction
existed over proscribed acts done in this country."7 6
Applying this test to the facts before it, the court stated that
"it is clear that any actual defrauding of investors took place in
West Germany, so that reliance and damages would have occurred
there.' 171 Therefore, it was left to consider whether Andersen com-
mitted acts in the United States that satisfied the other elements
of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 liability.1 8
The court acknowledged that "[o]ne possible theory of liabil-
ity that can be gleaned from the complaint is that [Andersen] and
GmbH are 'branch establishments,' parts of a single world-wide or-
ganization," which would open the possibility of concurrent liabil-
ity. However, the plaintiff had not raised this on appeal, and ac-
cording to the court, it was undisputed that the two accounting
firms were "completely separate legal entities."' 79 "The only other
theory of liability" that the court found in the complaint was the
allegation that Andersen acted willfully or recklessly in responding
to inquiries made by Andersen-GmbH. The plaintiff contended
that Andersen's misrepresentations or omissions made in said re-
sponses could foreseeably affect securities purchasers and indeed
had caused his and the other investors' damages. 80 However, the
court believed that, even supposing their truth, these allegations
alone would be insufficient to support jurisdiction under the cir-
cuit's newly-recited test. Even if Andersen made misrepresenta-
tions to Andersen-GmbH, its statements were neither made for
distribution to the public nor were transmitted to the public.'8 '
Andersen was "merely one of the sources" that the West German
accountants utilized in compiling their audit report, a report "pre-
pared and certified by GmbH alone.' '18 2
In sum, Andersen was not alleged to have prepared or certified
171 Id. at 33.
I'6 Id. In a footnote, the panel noted that it would find jurisdiction whenever an indi-
vidual was defrauded in this country, "for the actual consummation of securities fraud in
the United States in and of itself would constitute domestic conduct." Id. at n.4.








any part of the audit report that was distributed to investors and
the statements that it made never reached those investors. More-
over, Andersen's "alleged misrepresentations to GmbH were
'merely preparatory' to any fraud perpetrated on West German in-
vestors, and did not 'directly cause' their losses."18 The court
found that the plaintiff's claim of jurisdiction was weaker still be-
cause Andersen did not even prepare or audit the financial state-
ments that were distributed to West German citizens.184 Thus, the
D.C. Circuit declined to find subject matter jurisdiction.185
To summarize briefly, where courts have found subject matter
jurisdiction under the federal securities laws, the acts of the ac-
counting firm defendants were found to be plainly domestic in na-
ture. In Cornfeld, the Second Circuit found that "all the account-
ing work" was performed in the United States, and the opinions in
both F.O.F. I and F.O.F. II reveal that substantial activity took
place in the Denver, Chicago and New York offices of Arthur An-
dersen. Implicit in these rulings is a view that the acts in question
were not only domestic, but were sufficiently extensive to simply
overwhelm the foreign aspects of the transactions.
Zoelsch occupies the opposite end of the spectrum, where the
accounting firm in the United States played at best a de minimis
role. The D.C. Circuit made it plain that subject matter jurisdic-
tion would not be imposed absent a showing of something well be-
yond mere tertiary involvement by the domestic accountants. More
importantly, Zoelsch signifies a key milepost in the continuing
evolution of the standards delineating the scope of subject matter
jurisdiction under the federal securities laws.
,83 Id. at 35 (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992-93 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975)).
184 Id.
"I Id. at 36. Lastly, the panel rejected Zoelsch's final argument that all activity sur-
rounding a securities transaction be deemed "a single mass," and that jurisdiction should be
exercised over any individual defendant if the sum of all domestic activities by all partici-
pants in multiple transactions would be sufficient to support American jurisdiction. Id. The
court summarily dismissed this proposal: "It is obvious that this suggestion is completely
antithetical to the approach we have adopted here. It bears no relation to the tests for
determining jurisdiction that have been adopted by any of the federal appellate courts....
There seems nothing to recommend it." Id. at 36.
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The potential changes wrought by the DED decision's latest
permutation of the subject matter jurisdiction question undeniably
offer a number of numerous and diverse challenges to the account-
ing profession. In this author's view, the greatest challenge for in-
ternationally expanding multinational accounting firms is to be
found in the area of quality control.
In seeking to become more transnational, each accounting firm
aims to spread its own sphere of influence on a global basis, to
develop a multinational grid for servicing clients worldwide and, of
course, to perpetuate its own growth. In the process, accounting
firms are also "facing anew the festering issues" of, among other
areas, quality control. 8" To be sure, "[tihis is an area of real con-
cern because the reputation of the [accounting] firm depends on
the quality of the work it does.' 1 87 The decision reached in DED
may substantially increase the legal significance of the accounting
firms' efforts to maintain and improve quality control.
The Necessity of Quality Control
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA") has devoted considerable effort to formulating rules on
quality control. Seminal in this regard is the AICPA's Statement
on Auditing Standards No. 25, entitled "The Relationship of Gen-
erally Accepted Auditing Standards to Quality Control Stan-
dards." '188 Basically, this edict demands that "a firm should estab-
lish quality control policies and procedures to provide it with
reasonable assurance of conforming with generally accepted audit-
ing standards in its audit engagements.' 89
The doctrine of quality control may be found in the AICPA's
pronouncement of a "System of Quality Control for a CPA
'88 M. STEVENS, THE ACCOUNTING WARS 58 (1985).
1J7 J. ARPAN & L. RADEBAUGH, supra note 4, at 319.
'88 CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 25, § 161 (Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accts. 1981) [hereinafter 1981 CODirI-
CATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES].
189 Id. at § 161.02; see also CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES,
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 56.05 (JUNE 1, 1987) ("[D]ue care requires a member to
plan and supervise adequately any professional activity for which he or she is responsible").
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Firm."190 The preamble notes that the Statement mandates that a
CPA firm shall have a system of quality control, and continues by
describing elements of the system. 9 ' Thus an American firm is re-
quired to provide reasonable assurance that work "performed by
its foreign offices or by its domestic or foreign affiliates" will be
performed in accordance with professional standards prevailing in
the United States. "2
These quality control standards "relate to the conduct of a
firm's audit practice as a whole."' 3 The most crucial words therein
are those that relate quality control to the firm in its entirety,
which poses special problems for firms such as the Big Eight whose
practices span the globe.
It would seem that the system requirement established by the
AICPA was formulated in the context of assuring quality control
over work performed by foreign branch offices or affiliates as part
of an American-based engagement. However, with the shift toward
truly international undertakings, the Statement impliedly takes on
an even more powerful meaning in demanding that non-domestic
units strictly adhere to the quality control programs promulgated
by their American counterparts. 94
Supervision-A Global Task
The AICPA Statement on Quality Control Standards states
that "[p]olicies and procedures for the conduct and supervision of
work at all organizational levels should be established to provide
the firm with reasonable assurance that the work performed meets
the firm's standards of quality."'9 5 It is interesting to note the req-
uisite supervision "at all organizational levels," which would seem
to include supervision of routine work performed through the
'9o CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing
Standards, No. 1 at § 10 (Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants 1979). [hereinafter 1979
CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES].
Id.
192 Id. at § 10.05.
192 1981 CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 188, at §
161.03.
IN Quality control, as a general matter, imposes a complex burden on multinational
accounting firms. Each firm must establish standards relating to the whole of its practice. In
a transnational firm, this creates vast problems of devising, implementing and enforcing
those standards across the globe. Yet this is what the profession demands, notwithstanding
a firm's concomitant expenditures to ensure quality control on a multinational scale.
195 1979 CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 190, at §
10.07.d.
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chain of command. It is open to conjecture whether this supervi-
sion would also integrate work performed by similarly structured
offices of far-flung organizations, the structure of so many of the
larger, international firms today. For instance, one could easily
conclude that supervision at "all organizational levels" in a mul-
tinational accounting firm would entail individual foreign offices
being supervised by regional or national offices, which in turn
would be under the supervision of a higher office overseeing the
firm on an international scale.196
The Concurring Review-A Further Entanglement?
The quality control process has a further refinement known as
the concurring review of the accountant's final work product,
which would typically be the audit report. This entails a person
having no relationship to the engagement conducting a comprehen-
sive, "cold" review for the purpose of independently ensuring that
quality control is maintained. 1' Thus, additional assurance of
compliance with professional standards, particularly the standard
of supervision, is gained by an independent review of the underly-
ing documentation, financial statements and the accountant's
report.
The concept of the concurring review takes on even greater
significance in the realm of international accounting engagements.
In such an engagement the International Accounting Guidelines of
the International Federation of Accountants specify that "[r]eview
procedures may be augmented, particularly in the case of large
complex audits, by requesting personnel not otherwise involved in
the audit to perform certain additional review procedures before
196 Multinational accounting firms are again called to task. Supervision is demanded
from the lowest rung of the firm's structure to the penultimate point of its hierarchy. In a
global organization, this undoubtedly means that offices of different nationalities will at
some point share in the supervision of an ultimate authority with international
responsibilities.
'9' PATTILLO, QUALITY CONTROL AND PEER REVIEW: A PRACTICE MANUAL FOR CPAs at
112-13 (1984). The Statement of Quality Control Policies and Procedures for CPA Firms
contains a subsection specific to the topic of the concurring review. 1979 CODIFICATION OF
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 190, at § 90.16.3.b.(iii). The applica-
tion of the concurring review concept in the transnational area was no doubt inspired by its
status as a long-standing requirement in domestic SEC related practice. Within the body of
the AICPA itself is the SEC Practice Section, a group encompassing the major accounting




issuance of the auditor's report."' 99
The SEC Practice Section places its own stringent require-
ments on members. 199 It is worth noting the review process im-
posed for S.E.C. engagements. Each member firm must establish
policies and procedures "for a concurring review of the audit re-
port and the financial statements by a partner other than the audit
partner-in-charge of an SEC engagement before issuance of an au-
dit report."2 00
It seems that the importance of the concurring review is
bound to increase. Commentators note that the concurring review
"contributes to providing the firm with reasonable assurance that
the audit was performed in accordance with the profession's stan-
dards."20  There is a crucial need to maintain such quality controls,
given the public need for reliable data, the extent of losses when
an "audit failure" occurs and the ever-present threat of govern-
ment intervention by way of increased regulation.20 2 Advocates of
the concurring review visualize it as a quality control measure
which should be strengthened since it makes a great contribution
to maintaining professional standards. As the tasks put to the pro-
fession become more complex, the concurring review becomes a
more vital step in the quality control process. 203
Let us contemplate a situation where the concurring review
calls for the involvement of unrelated members of the firm in the
engagement of a particular office. Suppose for reasons of staffing,
experience, personnel availability, or any other cause, the concur-
ring review must be undertaken by a member of another office.
The reviewer may be from an office foreign to that of the principal
accountant. Thus, the necessity of the concurring review may re-
sult in the entanglement of offices foreign to each other within the
structure of a multinational accounting firm.
In sum, the multinational accounting firms are confronted
with a number of issues, each falling under the rubric of quality
control. First, they must establish pervasive, firm-wide quality con-
'9s CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, International Auditing
Guidelines No.7, § 8007.12 (1984).
119 DrusIoN FOR CPA FIRMS SEC PRACTICE SECTION MANUAL § 1, Art. IV at 3 [hereinaf-
ter SECPS Manual].
200 Id. at 3.f.
201 Mautz & Matusiak, Concurring Partner Review Revisited, J. OF AcCT. 56, 58 (March
1988).
202 Id. at 63.
203 Id.
1989]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
trol standards and systems. Second, supervision at all levels must
be maintained, including the supervision of entire geographic re-
gions. Third, the concurring review must be utilized to ensure
quality control in any given engagement. Each of the three points
raised above points to the conclusion that the standards of the pro-
fession strictly require the multinational accounting firms to create
and foster a strong interdependency and interrelationship among
all of their constituent units around the globe. However, DED cau-
tions that supervision by a U.S. accounting firm over its foreign
affiliates may expose the actions of the firm to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus, an increasing international
practice combined with the crucial requirements of quality control
raise the spectre of potential liability for those firms which cannot
keep pace with the ever more rigorous standards of the profession.
One leading observer has noted that some multinational firms
relish transnational engagements "for the belief that they will dis-
tance their firm from the class action lawsuits" and other such en-
tanglements of our litigious society. 0 4 Yet, as the same commenta-
tor notes, this is an illusion. "Global expansion compounds the
perils of high-visibility public practice by complicating the efforts
to establish and implement uniform quality controls. The broader
an accounting firm's sweep of practice, the greater the challenge"
to ensure the same standards are met wherever they may be ap-
plied.20 5 In addition, as shall be demonstrated, the DED decision
may very well cause a vast increase in the exposure of multina-
tional accounting firms to subject matter jurisdiction under the
federal securities laws as a result of these efforts to maintain qual-
ity control.
DISCUSSION
From the day of its issuance, the DED opinion was viewed by
the business and legal communities as "a potentially far-reaching
decision for the accounting profession. "206 Undeniably, expansion
of subject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws
would create a new layer of exposure for the multinational ac-
counting firms, particularly the Big Eight. As noted by one author-
204 STEVENS, THE ACCOUNTING WARS 90 (1985).
205 Id.
206 Berton, Accounting Firms Can Be Sued in U.S. Over Audit Done Abroad, Judge
Rules, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1988, at 10, col. 3.
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ity, "[t]his decision could have a serious impact upon the interna-
tional accounting firms which may find themselves defending
actions in the U.S. courts under our more stringent laws for partic-
ipating in predominately foreign engagements. '20 7 The extent to
which DED represents a bold, new venture into previously un-
charted territory will be examined in light of the foregoing discus-
sion of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Unanswered Questions of DED
In the court's view, subject matter jurisdiction in DED was
predicated on an application of the "conduct" test, it being certain
that the events therein could not pass muster under the "effects"
test.
DED dealt with a governmental agency of a foreign sovereign,
purchasing interests in a subsidiary wholly situated within its own
borders. Domestic investors and markets felt no effects from this
transaction whatsoever, and the effects were so generalized and
minimal that the requisite threshold to active jurisdiction was not
reached. The court was left with the "conduct" test. While Judge
Stewart's factual findings were by no means inadequate, they were
of course bound by limitations inherent in any adjudication of a
preliminary motion; subsequent proceedings at the trial and appel-
late levels will probably expand and refine the pertinent points.
The DED court found subject matter jurisdiction under the
federal securities laws where an accounting firm's foreign affiliates
undertook an overseas audit engagement of a foreign entity and
reported back their results, subject to some supervision from the
domestic offices. A number of difficulties immediately come to the
fore under these facts.
The DED court purposely did not fully address the degree of
affiliation among the accounting firms involved. For this reason, it
is unclear what the ultimate outcome should be on that discrete
point. As the opinion itself discusses, there is a question as to
whether AA-US, AA-UK and AA-Ireland were distinct entities or
parts of a more unified structure. If the latter is found, in this case
or others, it is unclear whether the question of subject matter juris-
diction shall be determined, at least in part, by the operational
structure of multinational accounting firms. The impact of this de-
termination on the overall management of accounting firms that
207 GOLDWASSER, ACCOUNTANTS' LIIuTY 1988 27 (1988).
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are already unified into one organization, or otherwise bound to-
gether as they become more transnational in the scope of their
practice, remains to be seen.208
The DED court admitted that most of the audit field work was
conducted by AA-UK and AA-Ireland in Europe. Nevertheless, the
fact that ultimate engagement partner responsibility resided in the
offices of AA-US was dispositive. Will the nomenclature of the ac-
counting profession take on an entirely new significance in light of
DED or subsequent opinions like it? To what extent will the inter-
nal distribution of responsibility levels widen the potential liability
of the multinational accounting firms under the federal securities
laws?
For example, the world's largest accounting firm, Klynveld
Peat Marwick Goerdeler ("KPMG"), °0 has stated, "for legal pur-
poses, on audit documents, it will be KPMG Peat Marwick Main &
Co.' '210 Will this usage of the international firm title on transna-
tional engagements impose legal responsibility on a domestic affili-
ate whose name is included therein? It is uncertain if the DED
rationale will compel other courts to find such internal policies to
be influential factors in activating subject matter jurisdiction
under the federal securities laws.
The DED court raised other serious questions when it consid-
ered the fact that AA-UK and AA-Ireland communicated with the
domestic offices of AA-US for guidance and support in determining
whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction. The impact on
the management procedures of a multinational accounting firm
cannot yet be adequately measured. But in light of DED, at what
level shall the interplay between a transnational accounting firm's
domestic offices and its foreign counterparts be deemed "conduct,"
rising above the "merely preparatory" threshold? The uncertainty
218 See J. oF ACCT. 15, 16 (March 1989). Arthur Andersen & Company recently an-
nounced that its practice shall now be divided into only three regional operating areas.
These regions shall be the Americas, Europe-Middle East-Africa and Asia-Pacific. A board
of partners will represent the regions. This action is intended to recognize the global growth
of the firm's business and its expansion beyond the traditional accounting firm structure.
Interestingly, critics claim that the new structure still does not address the key issue of
liability exposure stemming from audit-related litigation. Id.
20I See 1988 GuiNEss BOOK OF WORLD RECORDS 337-38 ("The largest firm of account-
ants worldwide is that resulting from the merger of Peat Marwick International and
Klynveld Main Goerdeler of the Netherlands announced on September 3, 1986 with a com-
bined annual revenue of $2,700 million and a total of 58,000 employees").
220 WEINSTEIN, THE BorroM LINE: INSIDE ACCOUNTING TODAY 214 (1987).
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could have a debilitating "chilling" effect on interoffice contact in
the future.
The opinion also made reference to professional standards
that the court deemed important in finding that AA-US had a
duty to supervise. The standards cited by the court in this regard
are quite different from those professional benchmarks discussed
elsewhere in this text. This finding may portend a foray by the
judiciary into standards of the accounting profession previously
unexplored in this context. If so, it is suggested that the danger in
pursuing such a course arises from reliance on certain standards
that may not be completely applicable, at the expense of other pro-
fessional requisites of equal, if not overriding, importance. Specifi-
cally, DED did not delve into the quality control and supervision
requirements that were elaborated upon earlier. This creates a
most dangerous situation for the accounting profession, because
while each firm must be guided by the larger framework of its pro-
fessional standards, DED and subsequent opinions like it may pri-
oritize those standards in divergent and conflicting ways.
DED-An Unwarranted Detour from the Second Circuit Trilogy?
The next point of discussion is a comparative analysis of the
Second Circuit precedents and the DED ruling. The DED opinion
may manifest itself as a breakthrough into previously uncharted
territory for subject matter jurisdiction, if indeed it does not re-
present an unwarranted diversion from the carefully crafted guide-
posts devised by that tribunal.
A number of the elements utilized in previous jurisdictional
tests were ignored in the DED opinion. Unlike Schoenbaum, there
was no need in DED to protect domestic investors and markets
from improper foreign transactions.2 11 The "conduct" test offers a
more complex set of questions. In Leasco, the Second Circuit
based its findings upon "abundant misrepresentations" made in
the United States that were actionable under the anti-fraud provi-
sions of our federal securities laws.212 Would that court today find
the domestic activity of AA-US, as noted in DED, "abundant"
enough in light of Leasco to find subject matter jurisdiction under
21 The DED case is more like IT, where the minimal American ownership of the stock
in question was not a sufficient basis for a finding of subject matter jurisdiction under the
federal securities laws. In DED the securities were wholly owned by a foreign entity (and a
governmental one at that) and not traded on any domestic market. Id.
212 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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the federal securities laws? Or would that tribunal, upon consider-
ing the far greater role of AA-UK and AA-Ireland in the engage-
ment and the more secondary participation of the American ac-
counting firm, deem the activity not to be substantial enough to
invoke subject matter jurisdiction?
The refinements offered in the Bersch case are even more illu-
minating in this regard. Bersch declared that domestic acts that
are "merely preparatory" and relatively insignificant compared to
activity abroad do not give rise to subject matter jurisdiction. It is
suggested that if an appellate panel reviewed DED, it might find
the domestic activity therein to be nothing more than "merely pre-
paratory" and quite insignificant in comparison to its foreign
elements.
The conservative tone of Bersch indicates that the Second Cir-
cuit intended that caution be exercised in labelling domestic occur-
rences more than "merely preparatory" for the purpose of activat-
ing subject matter jurisdiction. By instructing lower courts to
determine whether "predominantly foreign" transactions war-
ranted the intervention of the "precious resources" of American
courts and regulators, the Second Circuit warned that findings of
subject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws require
ample justification. "Moderation is all," cautioned the great Judge
Friendly. Was the DED court properly mindful of this
admonition?
This theme carried over into the HT decision. While the court
refused to allow the United States to be utilized as a base for ex-
porting securities fraud, it still maintained that "merely prepara-
tory" activities in this country could not give rise to subject matter
jurisdiction. This strict limitation was necessary in order to estab-
lish some boundaries for subject matter jurisdiction under the fed-
eral securities laws. Once again, did DED accord proper respect to
this restriction? Or did DED transgress the explicit mandate of
HT that a line must be drawn somewhere to prevent an unlimited
application of subject matter jurisdiction, especially with respect to
predominantly foreign transactions?
The jurisprudence of the Second Circuit does posit a recurring
theme, i.e., that the absence of certain elements present in earlier
cases would not necessarily preclude a finding of subject matter
jurisdiction in later cases. The tribunal might eventually rule that
DED contained aspects warranting a finding of subject matter ju-
risdiction, notwithstanding the lack of attributes found vital to
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such a holding in prior cases.
The Influence of Kasser and Continental Grain
The more revolutionary aspect of DED is the fact that its rea-
soning is more akin to the ratio decidendi utilized by the Third
Circuit in Kasser and the Eighth Circuit in Continental Grain.
Both of those circuit courts moved away from the more restrictive
formulations of the Second Circuit, choosing to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction since some domestic activity was found in the
foreign transaction at issue.
Kasser and Continental Grain found subject matter jurisdic-
tion under the federal securities laws where there was some activ-
ity in the United States, notwithstanding the presence of arguably
stronger foreign elements.213 Indeed, Continental Grain pushed to
the very edge of the scope of subject matter jurisdiction. While few
would argue that the domestic conduct was significant, the Eighth
Circuit insisted that the conduct should be measured by the more
vague and nebulous standard of "at least some activity" in the
United States. Moreover, the panel emphasized that this was a pol-
icy decision, motivated by its desire to prevent the overseas expor-
tation of American fraud.
In many ways, one might view DED as traveling to the brink
of the issue in that the finding of subject matter jurisdiction was
predicated on domestic conduct similar to the "some activity" in
Continental Grain rather than the more substantial activity for
which the Second Circuit has searched. Furthermore, while DED
does not hold itself out as a policy decision, was it nevertheless
influenced by the policy considerations which were so important in
Kasser? Is it implicit in DED that the district court sought to em-
ulate the Third Circuit and prevent the "pirates" of the accounting
profession from employing this nation as a "Barbary Coast" for
securities fraud? If indeed DED is more consistent with the hold-
ings of the Third and Eighth Circuits, then it shall be interesting
to see how the Second Circuit reconciles the errant opinion from
below with its own longstanding parameters.
Zoelsch-A Reawakened Conservatism
The possibility of a widening rift among already established
schools of legal theory magnifies the importance of the Zoelsch de-
213 See supra notes 75-85 and 92-106 and accompanying text.
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cision. To the extent it exposits the differing camps and then
places itself squarely on one side of the issue, it is a landmark
which might very well determine the future course of the case law.
As in Arthur Young, the domestic accounting firm in Zoelsch was
found to have acted insubstantially as compared to the more egre-
gious conduct perpetrated abroad. In contrast, Zoelsch can be
readily distinguished from Cornfeld and F.O.F. I and F.O.F. II,
where the domestic conduct of the American accounting firms was
so pervasive that it simply overpowered the otherwise predomi-
nantly foreign elements of the transactions at issue.
No appellate court has yet analyzed the type of activity ad-
dressed in DED. It is asserted here that the domestic conduct of
the accounting firm in DED did not rise to the overbearing level
found in Cornfeld and both of the F.O.F. decisions. Thus the for-
eign elements, in particular the more significant undertakings of
the overseas accountants, should control and thereby negate any
inference of subject matter jurisdiction. DED is more like Zoelsch
in that the tasks performed by the American accounting firm were
too small in comparison to the foreign activity to justify the impo-
sition of subject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities
laws. It is also noteworthy that the Zoelsch court issued its opinion
at a time when the reality of the global economy and the interna-
tional scope of the accounting profession could not be denied.
No doubt the Zoelsch court looked to the long history of the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction and foreign securities transac-
tions and realized that Congress has had ample time to address it.
Given the lack of Congressional initiative, the Zoelsch court stated
that it would be wrong to judicially mandate remedial measures,
and strongly disagreed with the circuit courts that had done so.
Quality Control-A Trigger for Jurisdiction?
Finally, there remains the matter of the growing tension be-
tween the multinational accounting firms' need to maintain quality
control guidelines and the increased exposure to jurisdiction aris-
ing from any attempt to implement those standards globally. Hav-
ing examined the relevant legal benchmarks, one can easily discern
the paradox which transnational accounting firms may face.
On one hand, the rigorous professional standards that the ac-
counting firms must abide by demand a comprehensive quality
control system that is installed and maintained on a transnational
basis. However, this creates an inevitable collision with the
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precepts of subject matter jurisdiction, for as such a system be-
comes more intricate and encompassing, it shall no doubt give rise
to domestic conduct which may activate subject matter jurisdiction
under the federal securities laws.
It is here that DED and decisions like it create the greatest
danger to the profession. Since a firm unavoidably acts on a global
scale, can one deny that the creation and maintenance of such a
system would entail domestic conduct, and probably significant
conduct at that? Consider the focus in DED on the contact be-
tween AA-US and its foreign affiliates. What if it were found that
any such contact and the concomitant domestic conduct was
purely related to the quality control function? Seemingly, DED
would still activate subject matter jurisdiction.
Clearly, the modern transnational accounting firm must estab-
lish a quality control system that interlocks all of its far-flung of-
fices into a comprehensive network, which necessitates establishing
a strata of supervising levels. Furthermore, greater reliance shall be
placed on the concurring review, which is yet another opportunity
for intervention between domestic and foreign offices.
Domestic conduct to maintain quality control will undoubt-
edly have some impact on the overseas offices of accounting firms
as they participate in predominantly foreign transactions. Under
the DED analysis, there is a strong possibility that subject matter
jurisdiction under the federal securities laws would be found, espe-
cially if DED represents a shift to the more permissive standards
of Kasser and Continental Grain.
In sum, we can see the quandary that the multinational ac-
counting firms face. To establish and maintain quality control,
they must act globally and thereby evoke domestic conduct per-
taining to foreign engagements. Yet to do so raises a clear and pre-
sent danger that such domestic activity shall be found a sufficient
basis for a court to impose subject matter jurisdiction under the
federal securities laws. To be sure, to sacrifice one for the other
would simply leave the accounting firms open to attack on the op-
posite front. This is the prodigious challenge to the accounting
profession which the DED decision beckons.
CONCLUSION*
In conclusion, it is asserted here that the DED opinion breaks
* As this article went to press, "[t]he Big Eight accounting firms took a giant step
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new ground and extends the limits of subject matter jurisdiction
under the federal securities laws to a point hitherto unknown. This
is a clear diversion from the carefully restrained view of the Sec-
ond Circuit in its well-established trilogy, and a shift towards the
more relaxed standards of the Third and Eighth Circuits. More-
over, it conflicts with the reaffirmance of the conservative view re-
cently propounded by the D.C. Circuit in Zoelsch.
The multinational accounting firms are now faced with an
even greater risk of being embroiled in litigation relating to
predominantly foreign transactions. Most importantly, DED cre-
ates an atmosphere where that danger is exacerbated by the need
of the accounting firms to maintain quality control on an interna-
tional scale.
There is no denying the fact that the accounting profession is
now global and shall always remain so. Likewise, professional stan-
dards of quality control must be followed religiously, lest the firms
face danger on that front as well.
Given this conflict, the multinational accounting firms, espe-
cially the Big Eight, must realize that in seeking to maintain high
professional standards as they grow internationally, they risk im-
position upon themselves of subject matter jurisdiction under the
federal securities laws. Truly, it is time for the Big Eight, and in-
deed the entire accounting profession, to beware.
toward becoming the Big Five." Wall St. J., July 7, 1989, at 3, col. 1. On the same day,
Arthur Andersen & Co. and Price Waterhouse stated they had commenced merger talks,
while Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells and Touche Ross & Co. announced an agreement in princi-
ple to combine. These developments followed the disclosure some weeks before that Ernst &
Whinney and Arthur Young & Co. had agreed in principle to merge and form Ernst &
Young. For the present, the new Ernst & Young would eclipse KPMG Peat Marwick as the
world's largest accounting firm. However, if the proposed Andersen-Price merger comes to
pass, it could produce a still larger firm. Id.
Such events emphasize two themes contained in this writing. First, a major motivation
for these combinations is the desire of the large accounting firms to become completely
international in scope by strengthening practice abilities in Europe and Asia. Id. at col. 1-2.
Second, creation of such far-flung organizations accentuates the need to maintain quality
control.
Clearly, as stated herein, the multinational accounting firms are now inexorably com-
mitted to wide-ranging international practices, increasing their exposure on a global scale.
And as they expand globally, the firms shall find it only more difficult to maintain the very
quality control so essential to minimizing that exposure.
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